Module 3 Induction and Confirmation

Theory and Reality - Chapter 3







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Overview

- The problem of confirmation
- Deduction, induction, abduction
- Hume's problem of induction
- How to understand confirmation:
- Hypothetico-deductivism (problems from logic)
- Instance confirmation (the problem of ravens)
- The new riddle of induction

Observation-----Hypothesis

How can **O** confirm **H**? How does **O** support **H**? What makes **O** evidence for **H**?

Logical empiricism... Again (no "state of the art" approaches)

Logical analysis of science

- "Logical analysis of science"
- P1: Observation 1
- P2: Observation 2
- Pn: Observation n
- Therefore
- C: Hypothesis (Theory)

Can such inferences from O to H be always deductive?

<u>NO</u>: $O \rightarrow Particular cases$ H \rightarrow Generalization

There is no purely deductive step from particular to general

Types of inference

- P1: Socrates is a man
- P2: All men are mortal
- C: Socrates is mortal

Deduction

True premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion

Types of inference

- P1: In January 1997, it rained in Paris
- P2: In January 1998, it rained in Paris
- P3: In January 1999, it rained in Paris
- C: It rains every January in Paris

Induction

True premises make the conclusion plausible (but not certain)

Types of inference

- P1: John loves beer
- P2: there is an empty bottle of beer on John's table
- C: John has drunk a beer

Abduction / Explanatory inference / Inference to the best explanation

True premises make the conclusion plausible (but not certain)

Induction and abduction

Induction and abduction are nondeductive inferences

They are very common in scientific and in everyday reasoning

Any examples?

Induction in science

(Enumerative) Induction Swan 1 is white, swan 2 is white... swan n is white (**O**)

Therefore

All swans are white (H)



Abduction in science

Abduction / Explanatory infer. There are unusually high levels of some rare chemical elements, such as iridium, in layers of the earth's crust that are about 65 million years old (**O**)

Therefore

(H)



NOTICE: while inductive logic (unlike deductive I.) cannot provide certainty, some logical empiricists (Hempel) tried to develop a theory of confirmation based on modeling inductive logic on deductive logic in the sense of stressing its formal aspects

- P1: Socrates is a man
- P2: All men are mortal
- C: Socrates is mortal

P1: A is B P2: All Bs are D C: A is D

Logical empiricists like Hempel tried to develop a purely formal theory of confirmation – in which inductive inferences can be assessed on the basis of their form

(Carnap worked on the theory of probability)



Nelson Goodman provided reason to believe that this cannot work



What reason do we have for thinking that the future will resemble the past?





What reason do we have for expecting the sun to rise tomorrow?



P: the sun hasrisen every dayso farC: the sun willraise tomorrow

But in principle the future might differ from the past



P: the sun hasrisen every dayso farC: the sun willraise tomorrow

Hume as an **inductive skeptic**: Induction is psychologically natural, but has no rational basis

Hume's skepticism: videos

Hume's Skepticism and Induction, Part 1

https://www.youtube.com/wat
ch?v=-QpUrSn3cWU

Hume's skepticism: videos

	Relations of ideas	Matters of fact
Metaphysical	Necessary	Contingent
Semantical / Logical	Analytic	Synthetic
Epistemologi cal	A priori	A posteriori
Example	"2+2=4"	"Some cats are black" 22

Hume's skepticism: videos

Hume's Skepticism and Induction, Part 2

https://www.youtube.com/wat
ch?v=dPlNsyXI-0c

How to understand confirmation in science

- 2 proposals (and related problems):
- Hypothetico-deductivism
- Confirmation by instances
 (Hempel's view)

Hypotheses in science are confirmed when their <u>logical consequences</u> turn out to be true

Logical consequence

A: 210000 people live in Padua B: more than 150000 people live in Padua

If A is true, B cannot be false; If A is true, then necessarily B is true; B follows logically from A

Logical consequence

- P1: Socrates is a man
- P2: All men are mortal
- C: Socrates is mortal

The conclusion of a deductively valid argument is a logical consequence of the premises



A: All swans are white

B: Swans 1, 2... n are white

B is a logical consequence of A

H: All swans are white



O: Swans 1, 2... n are white

Observational statement is a logical consequence of the **H**ypothesis



Observational statement is a logical consequence of the **H**ypothesis

Hypothetico-deductivism: if observational statements derived from H are true, then H is confirmed

If observational statements derived from H are true, then H is confirmed

ISN'T THIS CLEARLY TRUE?

NOT SO FAST! Problems from simple logic

- A: Padua is in Italy
- B: Stefano Cossara is male T

AvB: Padua is in Italy or Stefano Cossara is male

- A: Padua is in Italy
- B: Stefano Cossara is female F

AvB: Padua is in Italy or Stefano Cossara is female

A: Padua is in France

F

B: Stefano Cossara is male T

AvB: Padua is in France or Stefano Cossara is male

A: Padua is in France

F

F

B: Stefano Cossara is female F

AvB: Padua is in France or Stefano Cossara is female

Α	B	AvB
True	True	True
True	False	True
False	True	True
False	False	False

AvB is false if and only if both A and B are false
Logical disjunction (OR)

Α	B	AvB
True	True	True
True	False	True
False	True	True
False	False	False

If A is true, then necessarily AvB is true [the same applies to B]

Logical disjunction (OR)

Α	B	AvB
True	True	True
True	False	True
False	True	True
False	False	False

AvB is a logical consequence of A [the same applies to B]

AvB is a logical consequence of A

HvB is a logical consequence of H (H being any scientific hypoth.)

H: The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec

B: Stefano Cossara is male

AvB is a logical consequence of A

HvB is a logical consequence of H (H being any scientific hypoth.)

"The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec or Stefano Cossara is male" (HvB) is a logical consequence of "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec" (H)

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Hypothetico-deductivism says that hypotheses in science are confirmed when their logical consequences turn out to be true.

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"The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec or Stefano Cossara is male" (HvB) is a logical consequence of "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec" (H)

Hypothetico-deductivism says that H is confirmed when (HvB) turns out to be true.

"The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec or Stefano Cossara is male" (HvB) is a logical consequence of "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec" (H)

How to establish when (HvB) is true?

Η	B	HvB
True	True	True
True	False	True
False	True	True
False	False	False

If B is true, then necessarily HvB is true

If B is true, then necessarily HvB is true

In order to establish that HvB is true, I just need to check that B is true (Stefano Cossara is male): very easy!

According to hyp-deduct, if HvB is true, then H is confirmed

According to hyp-deduct, if "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec or Stefano Cossara is male" is true, then "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec" is confirmed

According to hyp-deduct, if HvB is true, then H is confirmed

According to hyp-deduct, if "Stefano Cossara is male" is true, then "The speed of light is 186,000 mi/sec" is confirmed

ABSURD: confirmation too easy!



(For Hempel's view)

How is it that repeated observations of black ravens can confirm the generalization that all ravens are black?

Hempel: all observations of instances of black ravens confirm the generalization that all ravens are black

All observations of an F that is also G supports the generalization "All F's are G"

All observations of an F that is also G supports the generalization "All F's are G"

ISN'T THIS CLEARLY TRUE?

NOT SO FAST!

Logical equivalence

Two sentences that say the same thing with different words

Two sentences such that, if the first is true, then the second cannot be false

Logical equivalence

1. John went to the store after he washed the dishes

2. John washed the dishes before he went to the store

Or 'paradox': a set of ideas that seem individually plausible, but give rise to an apparently implausible conclusion

1. Observations of black ravens confirm the generalization that all ravens are black

2. Any observation that confirms hypothesis H also confirms a logically equivalent hypothesis H'

3. "All ravens are black" equivalent to "All nonblack things are not ravens"

Observing a nonblack thing that is not a raven confirms "All nonblack things are not ravens"

In virtue of logical equivalence, it also confirms "All ravens are black"



Thus, observing a nonblack thing that is not a raven (e.g., a white shoe), confirms "All ravens are black"

ABSURD! "Indoor ornitology"





Reactions

Hempel: bite the bullet (Observing a white shoe does confirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black, though presumably only by a tiny amount)

Reactions

Good (1967): Perhaps observing a white shoe or a black raven may or may not confirm "All ravens are black." It depends on other factors.

(Holism)

Reactions

GS: Whether or not a black raven or a white shoe confirms "All ravens are black" might depend on the order in which you learn of the two properties of the object.

Video

<u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?</u> <u>v=_SKmqh5Eu4Y</u>



By Nelson Goodman

Logical empiricists like Hempel tried to develop a purely formal theory of confirmation – in which inductive inferences can be assessed on the basis of their form

(Carnap worked on the theory of probability)



Nelson Goodman provided reason to believe that this cannot work: there cannot be a purely formal theory of

confirmation



Socrates is a man All men are mortal Therefore, Socrates is mortal

Socrates is a man All men are carrots Therefore, Socrates is a carrot

(The first only contains true premises are true, the second also contains one false premise) BUT They are both valid: same form

A is B All Bs are Cs Therefore, A is C

- The moral: when it comes to validity, only form matters

- The logical empiricists would like a theory of confirmation (based on inductive logic) in which only form matters

- Goodman: no such theory can be constructed

Goodman's reasoning:

- •There are ind. arg. with the same form, but one good and one bad
- •Therefore, form is not sufficient to distinguish good from bad ind. arg.

•Therefore, a theory of confirmation exclusively focused on form ('purely formal') cannot work

- All the many emeralds observed,
 in diverse circumstances, prior to
 2018 have been green
- Therefore, all emeralds are green

Inductive or deductive? Good or bad?

- All the many emeralds observed,
 in diverse circumstances, prior to
 2018 have been green
- Therefore, all emeralds are green

A good inductive argument

- All the many emeralds observed,
 in diverse circumstances, prior to
 2018 have been grue
- Therefore, all emeralds are grue

<u>Grue</u>: An object is grue if and only if it was first observed before 2018 and is green, or if it was not first observed before 2018 and is blue



Before 2018 Before 2018 Not bef. 2018

<u>Grue</u>: An object is grue if and only if it was first observed before 2018 and is green, or if it was not first observed before 2018 and is blue
- All the many emeralds observed,
 in diverse circumstances, prior to
 2018 have been grue
- Therefore, all emeralds are grue

Inductive or deductive? Good or bad?

- All the many emeralds observed,
 in diverse circumstances, prior to
 2018 have been grue
- Therefore, all emeralds are grue

A bad inductive argument





A - Before 2018 B - Not Before 2018

All emeralds observed before 2018 are like A... Therefore, all emeralds observed starting from 2018 will be like B: **BAD!**

All the many emeralds observed, in diverse circumstances, prior to 2018 have been grue
Therefore, all emeralds are grue

- A bad inductive argument:
- It suggests that emeralds observed in the future will be blue on the basis of previously observed green emeralds

- All the many emeralds observed, in diverse circumstances, prior to 2018 have been green [good]
- Therefore, all emeralds are green
- All the many emeralds observed, in diverse circumstances, prior to 2018 have been grue
 [bad]
 Therefore, all emeralds are grue

But they have the same form!

- Two inductive arguments with the same form, but one good, the other bad
- Hence, form is insufficient to distinguish good from bad inductive arguments

 Therefore a purely formal theory of confirmation cannot work – contra logical empiricism

What's wrong with grue? 1) Reference to time ("before 2018 and is green, or if it was not first observed before 2018 and is blue")

What's wrong with grue? 2) 'Green' identifies a natural kind, 'grue' does not

Natural kind=grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world, as opposed to an artificial grouping





What's wrong with grue? 2) 'Green' identifies a natural kind, 'grue' does not

Natural kind=grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world, as opposed to an artificial grouping

PROBLEM: not always clear which kinds are natural



Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =1rUCyg4Ppso